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Summary – A rational negotiation strategy for coming multilateral negotiations regarding climate change
requires knowledge about possible social, economic and environmental effects of policy instruments for the abatement
of greenhouse gas emissions. With this purpose, an agricultural sector model is expanded to cover greenhouse gas
emissions from agricultural sources in Europe and policy instruments for their reduction. This modelling approach
concentrates on the application of a permit trade scheme for emission abatement within the Kyoto Protocol ‘first
commitment’ baseline. The effects derived of three alternative schemes are described in detail: the EU ‘burden
sharing’ agreement option defined as regional emission standards, emission trading between regions inside each
Member State, and finally, emission trading between all European regions. The analysis shows the importance of
selecting an adequate combination of instruments of emission abatement for the design of efficient emission reduction
policies.
Keywords: Kyoto Protocol, agricultural policy, economic modelling, tradable emission permits
Systèmes d’échange de droits d’émissions de gaz à effet de serre d’origine agricole en Europe : une
analyse comparative de différentes options
Résumé – Une stratégie rationnelle pour les négociations multilatérales à venir sur le changement
climatique requiert la connaissance des effets possibles des instruments politiques pour la réduction des
émissions des gaz à effet de serre sur le plan social, économique et environnemental. A cet effet, un modèle
sectoriel agricole est développé afin de couvrir les émissions de gaz à effet de serre d’origine agricole en
Europe et les instruments politiques visant à leur réduction. Cette approche de modélisation est basée sur
l’application d’un système d’échange de droits des émissions comparé au scénario de référence de la
première période d’engagement du Protocole de Kyoto. Les effets dérivés de trois systèmes alternatifs sont
décrits en détail : l’option EU d’accord de partage de la charge (définie comme standards régionaux), les
crédits d’échange entre les régions à l’intérieur de chaque Etat-membre et, finalement, les crédits
d’échange entre toutes les régions européennes. L’analyse montre l’importance de sélectionner une
combinaison adéquate d’instruments de réduction des émissions pour définir une politique
environnementale efficace.
Mots-clés : Protocole de Kyoto, politique agricole, modélisation économique, crédits d’émission
échangeables
JEL descriptors: C15, Q18, Q54
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1. Introduction
In October 2003 the EU adopted a proposal for a directive on CO2 emission trading to
be operable by January 2005 (Council of the European Union, 2003), establishing a
coordinated GHG (Greenhouse Gas) emission allowances Trading Scheme (ETS) over
all Member-States (MS). Applying to a list of energy and industrial production
activities covering all GHGs included in Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol (KP), the
legislation aims at reductions of GHG emissions in a cost-effective and economically
efficient manner (article 1). However, according to the categories of polluting activities
defined in Annex 1, only CO2 emissions are effectively covered by the directive.
Whereas trading is first applied only to industrial and energy-producing activities,
other sectors might be included in the future with a view to further improving the
economic efficiency of the scheme 1 through possible amendments (article 30). This
is an important point with regard to the potential extension to the agricultural sector.
The possible inclusion of agriculture in a carbon-based ETS is a controversial
issue. Saddler and King (2008) highlight the current debate in Australia and stress the
need to include incentives to adopt best-practice methods of emission abatement in the
agricultural sector, without effectively taxing production through any rigid emission
abatement mechanism. The Australian Government is expected to take a decision on
the inclusion of agriculture in its Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme in 2013, which
would raise the coverage of emissions through the scheme to 90%. Lennox et al . (2008)
and Kerr and Sweet (2008) describe the main characteristics of the New Zealand ETS,
where agriculture is foreseen to be included in a ’cap and trade’ scheme by January
2013, covering then 90% of total GHG emissions in year 2005. Breen (2008)
motivates the importance of targeting GHG emission from agriculture in Australia
and New Zealand, countries where this sector shows considerably larger emissions
shares (16% and 48% in 2006 respectively) than in the EU (10% in 2006). On these
grounds, he justifies the introduction of Irish agriculture in a ETS, since methane and
nitrous oxide emissions represent 25% of total GHG emissions. Radov et al . (2007)
analyse the scope and feasibility of a ETS for the UK, but do not include a quantitative
assessment of its relative merits relative to other regulatory approaches. Reilly and
Asadoorian (2007, pp. 192-194) claim that ETS in agriculture seem to perform better
than simple regulatory systems ( i.e. ‘cap’ on emissions), but they justify this with the
nature of the emission allowances ( i.e. perceived as tangible assets by regulators) and
not on economic reasoning. They also consider measurement, monitoring and
enforcement costs as a key issue for the design of policies targeting emission sources
and sinks in agriculture.
In order to analyse the quantitative effects of an EU-wide ETS for the agricultural
sector, a novel methodological approach is presented in the next section of this paper.
The scenario construction process and main model assumptions are described in
section 3. Section 4 discusses the main results and section 5 highlights the main
limitations of the methodological approach selected. Section 6 summarises the main
1 The list of activities included in the Directive might be subject to future revision.289
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findings and draws some reflections on the relevance of this study for the European
decision making process.
2. Modelling emission trading in CAPRI
2.1. Overview of the CAPRI Model
The CAPRI modelling system (Common Agricultural Policy Regional Impact
Analysis) is a large-scale comparative-static agricultural sector model with a focus on
EU27, Norway and Western Balkans, but covering global trade with agricultural
products as well (Britz and Witzke, 2008). Developed since 1996, it is now used by
different institutions, including the European Commission, for policy impact
assessment. From a technical perspective, CAPRI is split into two major modules.
The supply module consists of about 250 independent aggregate optimisation
models representing all regional agricultural activities as defined by the Economic
Accounts for Agriculture, each model representing the aggregate choices of farmers in
a Nuts 2 region (EuroStat regional classification). These supply models combine a
Leontief technology for intermediate inputs covering a low and high yield variant for
the different production activities with a non-linear cost function which captures the
effects of labour and capital on farmers’ decisions. This is combined with constraints
relating to land availability, animal requirements, crop nutrient needs and policy
restrictions (production quotas and set-aside restriction). The non-linear cost function
allows for perfect calibration of the models and a smooth simulation response rooted in
observed behaviour 2 .The supply models feature a high differentiation in production
activities (28 crop and 13 animal activities), capture the premiums paid under the CAP
in high detail and use an expected utility approach from stochastic revenues to model
the EU sugar quota regime.
The market module consists of a spatial, non-stochastic global multi-
commodity model for 40 primary and processed agricultural products, covering
40 countries or country blocks in 18 trading blocks. Bi-lateral trade flows and attached
prices are modelled based on the Armington assumption of quality differentiation
(Armington, 1969). The behavioural functions for supply, feed, processing and human
consumption in the market module apply flexible functional forms, so that calibration
algorithms ensure full compliance with micro-economic theory. This module allows for
market analysis at global, EU and national scale, including a welfare analysis.
As the supply models are solved independently at fixed prices, the link between
the supply and market modules is based on an iterative procedure. After each
iteration, during which the supply module works with fixed prices, the constant terms
of the behavioural functions for supply and feed demand of the market module are
2 The supply behaviour of CAPRI for the most important annual crops is based on Jansson (2007),
a further development of Heckelei and Wolf (2003). For animals, perennials and annuals crops not
covered by the estimation, exogenous own supply elasticities are used, which are as far as possible
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calibrated to the results of the regional aggregate programming models aggregated to
MS level. Solving the market module then delivers new prices. A weighted average of
the prices from past iterations then defines the prices used in the next iteration of the
supply module. Equally, in between iterations, CAP premiums, differentiated
according to the different decoupling schemes adopted by MS, are re-calculated to
ensure compliance with national ceilings (Pérez Domínguez and Wieck 2006, pp.113-
114 ; Britz et al ., 2006, p. 218).
The specific structure of CAPRI renders it especially suitable for agri-
environmental analysis. The regionalized programming models capture links between
agricultural production activities in detail, and allow, based on the differentiated lists
of production activities, inputs and outputs, to define environmental effects of
agriculture in response to changes in the policy or market environment. They allow for
the integration of different types of environmental policy instruments (pollution
standards/taxes and technical emission abatement options). As opposed to many other
regionalized agricultural sector models, the transparent link with the large-scale global
market model in CAPRI allows to model different trade policies capturing price
feedbacks for agricultural products from the rest of the world (Wieck et al ., 2006). A
specific market module for young animal trade ensures a plausible mix of pig and
cattle activities.
2.2. Methodological approach selected
Different methodological approaches to the analysis of trading schemes for GHG
emission abatement can be found in the literature. Springer (2003, p.528) classifies
these models into five categories: integrated assessment models, computable general
equilibrium models (CGEs), neo-Keynesian macroeconomic models , emission trading
models and energy system models. From this classification, Springer groups economic
models into three broad layers: ( i ) top-down economy-wide approaches, which include
CGEs and macroeconomic models, ( ii) bottom-up sector-specific models and ( iii) pure
emission trading systems.
The methodological approach proposed in this paper builds on features of the last
two groups. On the one hand, the emission trading scheme analysed in the paper
includes different GHGs calculated from a bottom-up perspective for different
agricultural processes ( e.g. production activities), based on specific interactions of
nitrogen flows in agriculture and an implicit technological choice ( e.g. current
agricultural management, fertilizing and feeding practices). Whereas energy and
transport models are widely used for modelling trade of GHG emissions from a
sectoral perspective, agricultural models can also play an important role here, especially
linked to the potential extension of existing emission trading schemes to this sector
(opt-in clause, article 30 of the KP). On the other hand, the methodology presented
includes an explicit emission trading scheme based on marginal abatement cost curves
(MACC) linked to regional emission constraints. Similar approaches can be found in
Holtsmark and Maestad (2002, p. 208), Jotzo and Michaelowa (2002, pp. 182-183),
Löschel and Zhang (2002, p. 720), Stevens and Rose (2002), Jorgenson et al . (2009,
p. 366). In this type of models, emitters interact with each other in order to find a
market clearing point where prices for permits are equal to marginal abatement costs.291
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Beyond the identified common features to other model systems, our modelling
approach opens up new possibilities that are described in detail below. We have
implemented the modelling of tradable emission permits in CAPRI in a separate
module 3 as shown in figure 1. The advantage of this modular approach is that it
requires no structural changes in the overall system and fits well to the existing system
based on a transparent combination of different components, allowing to a large extent
their independent maintenance and further development. Basically, besides the two
modules dealing with markets for final agricultural products and young animals
comprised in the system, a new regional trade module for GHG emission permits is
linked into the system. It updates permit prices and regional emission ceilings within
the overall iterative framework until a fix point is found.
Depending on the scenario selected, Nuts 2 regions are allowed to trade emission
permits with each other and face different transaction costs (TC) depending on whether
trade is taking place between agents in the same or in different MS 4. Moreover,
additional costs for setting up the necessary institutions for emission trading (fixed TC)
are also included in the decision-taking process.
The new module consists of two elements. Firstly, a new constraint in the supply
model defines GHG emissions from agriculture at regional level according to the
3 CAPRI Modelling system; revision version 498 of 30/05/2007.
4 It is considered realistic to assume lower transaction costs in the first case since trade between
emitters ‘within a country’ is comparably cheaper in terms of the administrative burden.
Figure1. CAPRI model flowwithexplicitconsideration of regionalemission permittradingI. Pérez Dominguez, W. Britz, K. Holm-Müller - Review of Agricultural and Environmental Studies, 90 (3), 287-308
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UNFCCC 5 emission accounting scheme. By setting an upper bound on GHG
emissions, effects of a standard or permit distribution for GHG emissions on
agricultural supply and intermediate demand at regional level can be simulated. The
related marginal abatement costs are derived as the shadow prices of the constraint.
These abatement costs enter in each iteration the second element: the newly developed
permit trade module. Based on a second order approximation of the marginal
abatement cost curve, it defines market clearing prices for emission permits and their
regional distribution in the EU27. Clearly, the iterative feedback from the global
market module allows simulating impacts on demand, trade and prices of the emission
ceilings, but also, impacts on the marginal abatement costs in agriculture resulting
from price changes.
In the permit trading module, interregional trade of permit allowances is
simulated by maximising the total rent from trading under a constant sum of
regional permits. At the market clearing point TC should account for the remaining
differences in regional permit prices 6, which should reflect the regional marginal
abatement costs. For the modelled multi-regional case, the permit trading module is
analytically constructed as a maximisation problem:
(1)







– Obje = surplus from emission trade
– α, β = intercept and slope of the regional permit demand function
5 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
6 Assuming rational behavior of the agents in the market and in the absence of transaction costs a
uniform permit price would be achieved at the optimum (equi-marginality principle).
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– AllowP i = initial distribution of permits (initial upper-bound imposed on
emissions)
– AllowP f = final distribution of permits for the region (after trading)
– PermitP i = initial permit price (shadow price of the emission restriction)
– PermitP f = final permit price (after trading)
– BuysIn = permits bought by region r from regions in the same MS
– BuysOut = permits bought by region r from regions in other MS
– SalesIn = permits sold by region r to regions in the same MS
– SalesOut = permits sold by region r to regions in other MS
– VarTC_Inst = per unit TC linked to the pre-implementation and
implementation of the scheme (institutional TC)
– VarTCIn = per unit TC directly linked to trade within the same MS
( e.g. brokerage fees)
– VarTCOut = per unit TC directly linked to trade with regions in other MS
( e.g. brokerage fees)
In the optimisation problem presented in equation (1) the sum of the areas below
the regional permit demand functions between the initial and the final
marketclearing situation is maximised. This is achieved by moving away from
the initialp ermit distribution to the final distribution . The area
change below the permit demand functions is comprehended by the objective function
and divided in two terms: () and
() . Variable TC are charged to the permit buyers and are
subtracted from the obtained rent.
The constraints of the problem are:
1. Equation (2): the total amount of permits allocated to a region in the market
has to be equal to the initial allocation plus purchases and sales, inside and
outside of the MS.
2. Equation (3): total permit sales from regions in other MS has to be equal to
total permit purchases from other MS (international permit trade balance).
3. Equation (4): total permit sales and permit purchases between regions in the
same MS have to be equal (national permit trade balance).
4. Equation (5): the initial regional permit price lays on the permit demand
function and is defined through the intercept, the slope and the initial permits
allocated to the region.
5. Equation (6): the permit demand function has to pass through the simulated
regional permit price, which is defined through the intercept, the slope and the
new amount of permits allocated to the region.
This approach is analogous to a consumer rent maximisation problem:
Agricultural producers demand permits according to their marginal willingness to pay
given by the individual permit demand functions, which reflect the marginal profits
attached to the emission constraint. With fixed prices for agricultural outputs, trade of
emission allowances must lead to income gains or at least to no change in income in
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Given the structure of the non-linear programming models, there exists no closed-
form representation of the marginal abatement cost curve. That is especially true under
changing output prices which impact marginal abatement costs. Accordingly, only a
second order approximation of the marginal abatement cost curves was implemented
through linear permit demand functions, designed to go in each iteration through the
initial regional permit price () which results from the application of the
uniform regional emission standard at the starting point and that estimated in the final
situation () . Therefore, the optimal demand for permits per region (i.e.
convergence to a point of the real Marginal Abatement Cost Curve, MACC) is achieved
within an iterative approach.
During the first iteration, permit allowances are distributed to regions based on
an equal percentage reduction of the GHG emissions in the baseline, and the shadow
price on the emission ceiling derived by solving the regional models deliver one point
on the regional MACC to which the permit trade models need to be calibrated.
Therefore, the permit trade module works during this first iteration with a vector of
assumed parameters αr and βr 7 of the MACC.
In the second and following iterations, the information delivered by the trading
module in the form of regional permit allowances () is used in the regional
supply models to update the emission ceilings and calculate an updated vector of
shadow values. With this information, intercepts and slopes for the linear permit
demand functions can be updated, since at least two equilibrium points coming from
the supply model (points on the real MACC) are available. This is shown in the
following equation.
(7)
The iteration process is repeated until no noticeable price changes are observed
between the results delivered by the supply model and the permit trading module for
a vector of permit allowances (the value of the objective function of the permit trading
module is at its maximum). At this stage, the final equilibrium is achieved.
3. Scenario construction
3.1. Baseline
CAPRI combines expert judgements and trend analysis to provide a scenario baseline,
used as comparison point for counterfactual analysis. The baseline may be interpreted
as a projection in time covering the most probable future development of the European
agricultural sector under the status quo policy and including all future changes already
foreseen in the current legislation. Expert data on future trends are obtained from
internationally reliable sources doing forecasting research at EU level (Commission of
7 Please note that these slopes are only selected as a starting point as to allow for fast convergence
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the European Communities, 2005) and for non-EU regions and exogenous drivers
(FAO, 2003). This information and own trend projections using time series from the
current CAPRI database are fed into an estimator which chooses the most likely
combination of forecast values subject to a larger set of consistency restrictions
( e.g. closed area and market balances, feed requirements, production quotas, set-aside
restriction, composition of cattle herds).
Similar to CGEs, calibration of the non-linear programming models is based on
the definition of a parameter set fulfilling first-order conditions at the pre-defined
baseline results, including both parameters of the non-linear costs function and
technical coefficients. On the market side, the projection results at EU27 level plus
Norway and Western Balkans are taken as given for calibration. In the calibration step
bilateral import and export flows from these countries to other trade blocks are defined,
as well as development of agricultural production, feed use, processing activities and
human consumption. In this paper the CAPRI baseline comprehends all the changes
foreseen in the Common Agricultural Policy until 2013.
3.2. Emission restriction scenarios
In this scenario block, an 8% emission reduction on GHG emissions from agriculture is
analysed. This emission reduction target covers all EU27 MS and is projected to happen
in year 2013 (end of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol) on top of the
current legislation. In order to implement it, two policy options have been selected:
– A regional homogeneous emission standard of 8% with respect to the
baseline. The reduction is equal in relative terms in all European regions, and
thus independent from differences in abatement costs (see column 2 of table 2).
Table 1. Exogenous drivers considered for the baseline construction
Exogenous driversValue
Inflation 1.9% per annum
Growth of GDP per capita
20% nominal per annum for the EU 10.5% for India, 1.5% for USA,
4% forRussia,1.5%forLeastDevelopedcountriesandACPs,and1%for
the rest.
Demographic changes EUROSTAT projections for Europe and UN projections for the rest of
countries in the world
Technical progress
0.5% input savings per annum (affecting exogenous yield trends), with
the exemption of N, P, K needs for crops where technical progress is trend
forecasted.
Domestic Policy
National decisions on coupling options and premium models, with their
expected implementation date for the EU25 MSs (25 different premium
schemes, compilation by Massot Martí, 2005).
Common Market Organisations Supply and demand shifted according to the expert forecasts (Commission
of the European Communities, 2005).
Trade policy Final implementation of the 1994 Uruguay round plus some further
elements as NAFTA.
World markets Supply and demand forecasts (FAO, 2003).I. Pérez Dominguez, W. Britz, K. Holm-Müller - Review of Agricultural and Environmental Studies, 90 (3), 287-308
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Table 2. GHG emissions in 2013: baseline and different emission restriction scenarios a
2013 Baseline














EU27 578 518 – 8.0– 7.6– 7.7
EU255 59 880– 8.0– 7.8 – 7.8
EU15 487 671– 8.0– 7.2– 7.7
EU107 2 210– 8.0– 11.9 – 4.6
Belgium/Luxemboug1 0 791 – 8.0– 5.0– 4.6
Denmark1 2 828– 8.0– 5.0– 5.1
Germany87 314 – 8.0– 5.0– 5.8
Greece8 046– 8.00 .0– 3.8
Spain 67 690– 8.0– 10.0– 10.2
France1 25 290– 8.0– 5.0– 4.5
Ireland 24 592– 8.0– 10.0– 11.2
Italy46 542– 8.0– 5.0– 4.5
Netherlands15 066 – 8.0– 5.0– 4.6
Austria8 881 – 8.0– 10.0– 6.2
Portugal6 312– 8.0– 5.0– 5.1
Sweden 8 193– 8.0– 5.0– 4.4
Finland 6 264– 8.0– 5.0– 3.3
United Kingdom 59 862 – 8.0– 15.0– 16.9
Czech Republic12 690– 8.0– 10.0– 8.2
Estonia986– 8.0– 10.0– 6.7
Hungary 12 033 – 8.0– 5.0– 6.8
Lithuania7 201– 8.0– 15.0– 11.8
Latvia2 223 – 8.0– 15.0– 11.6
Poland 29 801– 8.0– 15.0– 9.5
Slovenia2 418 – 8.0– 10.0– 10.8
Slovakia4 122 – 8.0– 10.0– 6.6
Cyprus 664– 8.0– 10.0– 2.7
Malta71– 8.0– 10.0– 10.9
Bulgaria5 261– 8.0– 10.0– 9.5
Romania13 377 – 8.00 .0– 4.1
a Emission inventories for MS have been cross-checked ex post for year 2001 (calibration point of the version
of CAPRI used for this study) and the development of emissions up to year 2013 (baseline) directly linked to
exogenous drivers (see table 1) affecting activity data and emission factors. Therefore, emission inventories in
the baseline might deviate from historival trends on emissions.
Source : CAPRI Modelling System; projection to year 2013297
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The baseline emissions in CAPRI are calculated based on the emission
coefficients published by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), the nutrient content per activity and the projections responding to the
most-likely development of the international agricultural markets (see column 1
of table 2).
– In order to find a more suitable solution for balancing the burden of emission
abatement, an ad hoc burden sharing agreement for agriculture (BSAA) is
proposed for the EU27, where percentage reductions differ between MS, but are
identical for regions inside the same MS. The purpose is to analyse a regionally
differentiated emission standard by building 4 clusters of MS with different
emission reduction targets (no change, – 5%, – 10% and – 15%, see column 3
in table 2). This clustering is done by trying to close the gap to the actual
marginal costs of abatement in the regions, derived from a hypothetical
situation of perfect convergence of marginal costs through permit trade with no
TC (see column 4 in table 2). With this rationale, the efficiency of the policy
measure in terms of welfare is increased.
3.3. Trade of emission permits
In this scenario block, the scenario analysis is enhanced by the explicit implementation
of a European market of GHG emission permits from agriculture. With this purpose,
information on TC 8 related to existing trading schemes is explicitly considered, since
they are meant to have an important effect on the economic performance of such an
instrument. Similar to Jorgenson et al . (2009), two policy implementation options
based on different scopes for trading are considered here:
– Unrestricted emission trading. In this scenario, an 8% emission reduction
target is enforced for the aggregate of all EU27 regions while trade across
regions is allowed without restriction. The original permit distribution is based
on the regional emissions in the baseline minus 8%. Variable and fixed TC are
introduced, increasing marginal abatement costs. Variable TC are mainly
brokerage fees and are paid by permit buyers. In the current study, they are
assumed to be 5 E per ton of CO2 equivalent for purchases within a MS (trade
between national agricultural producers) and 10 E per ton for purchases from
abroad (trade between agricultural producers in different EU MS). These values
are based on estimates from various studies which report handling fees in
international trading schemes to be between 2 and 10 % of the transaction
value (compilation by Eckermann et al ., 2003, p. 16). For the selection of the
‘appropriate’ values in relation to the final permit price, a simple ‘sensitivity
analysis’ for different values is carried out with the model. Moreover, a further
10 MM E are assumed as institutional costs of the trading scheme (2 MM E per
year with 5 years of amortisation). These are also assumed to be paid by permit
buyers and therefore distributed over transactions. They are defined based on
8 Transaction costs are those costs that arise from initiating and completing transactions, such as
finding partners, holding negotiations, consulting with lawyers or other experts, monitoring
agreements, etc. (Coase, 1937).I. Pérez Dominguez, W. Britz, K. Holm-Müller - Review of Agricultural and Environmental Studies, 90 (3), 287-308
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information found in the literature for clean development mechanism (CDM)
and joint implementation (JI) projects in different economic sectors and size of
the markets (compilation by Eckermann et al ., 2003, pp. 6-8) 9 .
– Restricted emission trading. In this scenario, an 8% emission reduction target
is enforced for all regions within the EU27 but trade is only allowed within
countries. The idea is to mimic existing trading schemes in the EU ( e.g.
different trading schemes of milk quotas). The original permit distribution
remains the same as in the previous case.
3.4. Model assumptions
The results provided by this emission trading model are linked to some general model
assumptions. First of all, full rational behaviour of regional agricultural producers is
assumed in CAPRI. Whereas agricultural profit is maximized subject to economic and
agronomic constraints, supply and market balances in an open economy have to be
cleared out. Secondly, the calculation of GHG emission indicators root in ( a ) the basic
economic behaviour of the model, i.e. optimal cropping patterns at regional level, ( b ) a
balanced nitrogen flow model based on explicit energy requirements and deliveries per
agricultural activity, and ( c ) a set of emission factors derived from the literature (IPCC,
2006). Total emissions per MS are, therefore, the result of these three factors. Thirdly,
it is important to stress that the information on permit prices is directly linked to the
shadow values of the emission constraints included in the regional supply models. Since
no additional information on emission prices for the proposed EU trading scheme was
available, no additional calibration efforts were done here (contrary to e.g. explicit
calibration of land prices in certain MS where information was available). Last but not
least, TC are assumed to be additional costs for agricultural producers and are linked
to the size of the modelled emission trading scheme, as estimated by PriceWaterhouse-
Coopers (2000).
4. Selected Results
The overall effect of emission abatement measures on agricultural markets is a
reduction in production. This is not very surprising since the emission target mainly
leads to a structural response in the regional supply models. Changes in intensity of
crop production by adjustment of yields play a far minor role in the current set-up of
the supply models. Nevertheless, this effect can vary across activities depending on the
emission weight attached by the ‘emission accounting system’ (income/emission
relationship) and regions depending on the substitution possibilities found in each
regional model ( i.e. agricultural income is always maximised subject to constraints).
Therefore, we can distinguish the availability of regional resources, such as land (arable,
9 The reader should be aware of the fact that the initial distribution of the permits has an impact
on the final distribution if transaction costs are taken into account, so that the Coarse Theorem does
not hold. This theorem implies that all parties in a trading scheme can achieve the social optimum
if the transaction cost is low, property rights clearly defined and enforced and everyone has full
information.299
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grass and fallow land), the intensity of production and the regional cost structures as
the main drivers for results.
The supply effects resulting from the reduction in GHG emissions have a sizeable
impact especially on agricultural prices where ( a ) demand elasticities are low, ( b ) EU
border protection is high and market access falls under a tariff rate quota, and (c ) GHG
emissions per unit of product are high. All these factors are found in beef markets,
where price increases by 16% at EU level in the scenarios. This price increase is also
due to the fact that methane emissions from ruminants are an important part of the
overall GHG emissions from agriculture, leading to a drop in beef production by
around – 5%. The strong impacts for the beef production chain are also due to the
milk quota system, i.e. milk production and dairy cow herds do not change, instead,
milk quota prices drop.
Whereas adjustments for sheep and goat are somewhat smaller, with production
falling in the range of – 3%, pork production remains almost stable and poultry
production even increases due to substitution effects on the demand side. Supply of
cereals also drops in the range of – 6%: On the one hand due to a reaction of lower
demand when meat output drops and, on the other hand, due to high opportunity
costs for fertilization. The high global warming potential of nitrous oxide, emission
restrictions put a higher burden on production of fertilizer-intensive crops. Moreover,
the reduced number of ruminants leads to an extensification effect on grasslands, with
yields dropping by – 12%, and a reduction in silage maize production by –6%.
In map 1, the regional abatement costs attached to the imposition of a regional
homogeneous emission standard of 8% with respect to the baseline are presented.
With a homogeneous emission standard at a regional level, the average marginal
abatement cost for the EU27 is 95 euros per tonne ( E /t) of CO2 -equivalents (CO2 eq).
The regional costs vary between 30 and 230 E /tCO2 eq. These results are consistent with
the literature. Under similar assumptions, De Cara et al . (2005) estimate for the EU15
marginal abatement costs of 123 E /tCO2 eq for an 8% emission standard on methane
and nitrous oxide emissions from agriculture in year 2001. By introducing emission
taxes their estimates go down to 55.8 E /tCO2 eq ( i.e. results comparable to an
unrestricted permit trading scheme without TC, see table 3).
With a burden sharing agreement at a MS level (see map 2), the average marginal
abatement cost for the EU27 drops to 77 E /tCO2 eq. The regional variation in marginal
abatement costs is reduced with respect to the previous case, as the burden sharing was
defined based on marginal abatement costs.
If permit trading is introduced, the average marginal cost for the abatement of a
CO2 eq emission in the EU27 varies between 73 E (in the case of no TC), and 89 E in
the case of intra-national trade. In table 3, the convergence of prices at MS level is
presented. Increases beyond the burden sharing solution are due to taking TC of the
trading scheme into account.
This is achieved after several iterations and with the consideration of endogenous
market prices for agricultural products. Slight differences in total abatement in the first
column of table 3, are due to a lack of full convergence between the emission ceilingsI. Pérez Dominguez, W. Britz, K. Holm-Müller - Review of Agricultural and Environmental Studies, 90 (3), 287-308
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implemented in the programming models and the allocation of permits generated by
the permit trade module. These differences, however, were considered minimal and did
not affect the results. The third column of table 3 actually shows the differences in
marginal abatement costs amongst countries (i.e. here convergence of permit prices is
only achieved within the Nuts 2 regions of a MS). For instance, the EU15 presents
considerably higher marginal costs than the EU10 (90E versus 70 E), what is dampened
when trade of permits is allowed (77 E versus 73 E, see column 2, table 3).
If emission trading is introduced under explicit consideration of TC, the purchases
and sales of permits go up to 8.2 MM tCO2eq. Of this amount, around 90% of the
purchases come from abroad and 10% due to trade within national borders, which is
explained by the higher differences in marginal abatement costs between different MS.
As shown in map 3, most of the regions in France, Netherlands, Denmark and Italy are
a net permit buyers, whereas Eastern European regions are permit providers (due to
lower marginal abatement costs).
This picture changes when permit trade is restricted and only agricultural
producers within a MS are allowed to trade (see map 4). In this case only 3.2 MM
tCO2eq are traded, what also leads to a much less smooth convergence of permit prices
between regions (see column 3 in table 3), along with higher average abatement costs
for the EU as a whole.
Map1. Marginalabatementcostswithanemissionstandard(inthousandE/t CO2eq)
Source: CAPRI Modelling System; projection to year 2013301
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5. Limitations of the study and further research
There are several effects which are not covered in the current analysis worth to be
mentioned. Firstly, emission abatement in our model is related strictly to agricultural
direct emissions 10 and does neither cover indirect emissions, like e.g. related to
fertilizer production, nor emissions from other pollutants, like e.g. SO2, nor changing
carbon sequestration resulting from changes in land management techniques and
introduction of alternative crop rotations (as in Lal, 2004; Reilly and Asadoorian,
2007, p. 178). Secondly, the analysis is restricted to agricultural GHG emissions in
EU27, excluding emission leakage due to changes in production in other parts of the
world substituting reduced EU production (as in Laurijssen and Faaij, 2009).
Accordingly, due to our restriction to agriculture changes in the forestry or energy
sectors resulting from adjustment in agricultural production are not considered (as in
Böhringer, 2000, p. 780 ; Truong et al., 2007). Moreover, agricultural processing
activities for explicit mitigation of GHG emissions, e.g. biofuel or biogas production
(Gielen et al., 2003, pp. 179-180; Pathak et al., 2009, p. 408) are subject to further
Map2. Marginalabatementcostswithaburdensharingagreementforagriculture(inthousand
E/t CO2eq)
Source: CAPRI Modelling System; projection to year 2013
10 As included in paragraph 4 of the official reporting to the UNFCCC by MS.303
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research. Therefore, in our model emission abatement is mostly related to changes in
the farm production program and not to improved process management. The analysis
hence builds on a rather simple and straightforward emission accounting scheme and
not on on-farm measurements of emissions or more elaborated emission coefficients
depending on single processes (as in Moran et al., 2009). However, given the high
numbers of agents involved, the high control and administration costs to include in
Pan-European Legislation, the presented simplified approach could be more suitable for
agriculture (opt-in solution for agriculture, so that farmers or groups of farmers can
take part in the climate control schemes based on a rather simple accounting scheme).
This is in line with Monni et al. (2007, p. 530), who warn of increasing uncertainties
and marginal emission reduction costs linked to a too complex extension of the current
EU-wide ETS to other sectors and gases.
Map 3. Purchases of emission permits at the regional level with unrestricted trade (trade of
permits allowed across MemberStateborders)(in thousandunits)
Source:CAPRI Modelling SystemI. Pérez Dominguez, W. Britz, K. Holm-Müller - Review of Agricultural and Environmental Studies, 90 (3), 287-308
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6. Conclusions
In this paper an EU-wide trading scheme of GHG emission permits from agriculture
is proposed. The characteristics are: (1) full coverage of EU27; (2) distribution of
permits between handed out to agricultural producers free of charge and linked to
historical emission records, i.e. grandfathering; (3) regional 11 emission trading only
within each country, i.e. restricted trade, or also across MS borders, i.e. unrestricted
trade; (4) explicit consideration of TC in trading; and (5) no enforcement penalties
considered. With this purpose a partial equilibrium model CAPRI has been used.
Moreover, in this paper a burden sharing agreement between the EU27 Members
in order to meet a certain target for agricultural GHG emissions in 2013 at EU27 level
is explicitly simulated, i.e. different emission reduction rates per country. Such an
Map 4. Purchases of emission permits at the regional level with restricted trade (trade of
permits onlyallowed within MemberStateborders)(in thousandunits)
Source: CAPRI Modelling System
11 Here it is important to remind the reader that the Nuts 2 spatial aggregation level is the highest
resolution available in the CAPRI modeling system and, therefore, used in this study. A higher
resolution in space (e.g. Nuts 3) could improve the analysis if reliable information would be
available. However, EuroStat did not provide time series on yields and activity levels at NUTS 3
level at the time when the model was parameterized.305
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agreement already exists for the EU at economy wide-scale. The burden sharing
agreement analyzed here for agriculture is based on economic efficiency solely,
i.e. country with low abatement costs must achieve higher reductions. In real world
negotiations agreements, other aspects such as “fairness” ( e.g. regarding chances for
economic growth for the poorer MS) and historical events ( e.g. different
industrialization processes in Eastern European countries) play an at least equally
important role.
Our analysis sheds light on three different aspects of the GHG emission
abatement debate. The first one adds an agricultural perspective to the general
discussion. It has been shown that at least when applying a rather simple accounting
scheme, abatement costs in agriculture are in a similar or even higher magnitude than
in other sectors (70-90 E /tCO2 eq for an 8% emission reduction).
The second important aspect relates to the economic consequences of including
agriculture in any GHG abatement scheme. Given in many cases prohibitive most
favourite nation (MFN) import tariffs for agricultural and food products,
environmental legislation forcing large-scale reduction of agricultural production in
Europe leads to sizeable price increases for agricultural products, given a rather
inelastic demand. An EU-wide GHG emission ceiling for agriculture, as simulated in
our analysis, acts as an implicit supply control for agricultural production as a whole.
Analogously to a quota regime, it may lead to a positive quota rent for farmers and
agricultural profits could hence increase. The latter will typically come at the cost of an
even higher increase in the food bill due to net economic welfare losses from the
additional market interventions.
GHG abatement in agriculture via emission restrictions let production costs and
food prices increase. With their high expenditure share for food, the highest relative
burden will be carried by poorer households. Alternatively, abatement measures in
agriculture might be financed by tax regimes, e.g. in form of support to farmers for
implementing GHG saving technologies. Effects on households of such programs will
depend on the direct and indirect tax shares of household income, and probably put a
higher burden on richer households.
The increasing effect on price and farm income may be dampened at higher world
prices for agricultural products observed during the so-called food crisis in 2007/2008,
where EU border protection is no longer such a definitive factor. Equally, the EU
agricultural tariffs are to a larger extent specific ones which are slowly being eroded by
inflation. Even if thus probably small, the farm income increasing effect should render
it attractive to include agriculture in GHG emission strategies as long as supporting
farming income is still a major policy objective of the CAP. Design of GHG
legislation for agriculture is further eased by the fact that we deal with a global
externality linked to many different economic activities. It can hence draw on
comparing agricultural MACC to those in other sectors already operating under a
trading scheme.
The third aspect relates to implementation issues of policy abatement measures.
Whereas there is no doubt that market solutions are superior to standards in a
hypothetical world without implementation costs, the picture is far less clear when
public and private TC come into play. For the analysis at hand, it is obvious that theI. Pérez Dominguez, W. Britz, K. Holm-Müller - Review of Agricultural and Environmental Studies, 90 (3), 287-308
306
control costs for the emission standard or permit trade options would be probably
rather similar: crop shares, animal herds and fertilizer sales would need to be monitored
at farm level. However, if actual emissions were to be monitored the costs of
implementing and controlling the market – public and private ones –, could
drastically reduce welfare gains.
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